

ECPC



FROM: PS FAIRWEATHER
DATE: 26 04 1988

Charles POWELL Esq
No 10

Dear Charles

As discussed, I enclose photostat copy of the most important papers on obtaining additional funds to help reduce Soviet influence in Africa. I understand that our bid for the Africa Defence Equipment Fund has survived thus far and is included in the FCOs PES bid for FY 89/90 and the following two years.

*Yours ever
Patrick*

PS FAIRWEATHER

FROM: PS FAIRWEATHER
DATE: 22 March 1988
cc: Heads of
SAFD
CAFD
EAD
WAD

Mr MUNRO

1988 PES ROUND: BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEETING

1. As background to the bid attached in the papers under Mr Crabbie's minute of 17 March, you may wish to look again at my minute of 23 February which covers the additional bid over and above that already agreed at your meeting earlier this year and which arises directly out of the Prime Minister's visit to Africa.

2. There will be pressure to cut back on the total additional FCO bid. I hope our African bid can be spared. The sum involved of £5.7 m is only a little over a quarter of the programme bid. By no stretch of the imagination can it be described as meaning that we are giving disproportionate weight to Africa. A telling comparison would be with the £10 m which Mr Caines has just given to Malawi.

3. Let me deal separately with the UKMTAS bid (Annex A of my minute of 23 February) and the Africa Defence Equipment Fund (Annex B).

4. Additional UKMTAS bids. The following are the essential elements:

(a) FLS plus South Africa's neighbours. Ten separate bids, none larger than £0.5 m but which collectively will we calculate have a considerable impact in demonstrating the UK's commitment to regional stability. Bid (d) for the Zimbabwe Staff College Logistics Training Team is probably the most important after bid (i). As you and I both know from our visits to Harare, the ZNA wish to add a logistics wing to the Staff College. If successful this bid would ensure that ZNA training remains overwhelmingly British orientated. In other words we are keeping out the Russians.

As regards measuring the impact of what we are doing, Mr Smith in MRS has agreed that it would be very difficult to establish meaningful targets which would enable departments to evaluate additional expenditure. I would,

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however, bring to your attention para 6 of Mr Allan's teletype to Mr Cullimore in which he draws a direct connection between our training and the refusal of additional Soviet military training.

(b) Kenya/Uganda. Two very small programmes which I hope nevertheless we can retain.

(c) Nigeria. Two rather larger programmes entirely justified by the importance which the Prime Minister gives to the maintenance of our defence relationship with Nigeria - a country with which she believes we can work to reduce Soviet influence in Africa. History has demonstrated that the Nigerians in their present economic circumstances find it almost impossible to pay for military training. If these bids are successful, it should be possible to avoid a recurrence of past problems.

Africa Defence Equipment Fund

5. As you know, UKMTAS funds are not supposed to be used for the supply of non lethal (or indeed lethal) military equipment. Only by robbing the FCO contingency reserve were we able during FY 1987/88 to provide small but operationally important quantities of non lethal equipment to Malawian and Zimbabwean units operating in Mozambique. We cannot rely again on the contingency reserve. It is essential that we should be able to draw on an Africa Defence Equipment Fund as proposed in Annex B for Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania. With our enhanced UKMTAS bid this will demonstrate that we are determined to make our considerable economic aid to SADCC effective by improving security on the railway lines through Mozambique.

6. Somalia A special case. President Moi worries that the Presidential succession might bring about an increase in Soviet influence there. The drastic cut in US military aid to Somalia will certainly not help to keep Somalia lined up against the USSR. Our bid (guessed) of £250.000 for spares for Hawker Hunter aircraft would be a demonstration of our commitment to Somalia, which is best done through military assistance.

7. Nigeria. A minor bid. Nevertheless important to make our training fully effective.

8. All the bids correspond with the objectives of the African Departments as set out in paragraph 4 of my minute of 24 February.

PS Fairweather

PS FAIRWEATHER

From: P S Fairweather

Date: 27 January 1988

cc: Mr Munro
Mr Crabbie, Finance Dept
Mr Prendergast, SAFD
Mr Cullimore, CAFD
Miss Fort, WAD
Mr Marsden, EAD
Mr Yarnold, Defence Dept

Mr Goulden

REDUCING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

1. Mr Powell's letter of 8 January to Mr Parker set out the Prime Minister's reflections following her visit to Kenya and Nigeria. The Prime Minister was interested to find a strong echo of her concern about Soviet policies in Africa. She wanted to see us make more of this in our relations with African governments. It was evident that there was scope for us to influence the situation in Angola and for reducing the Cuban and Soviet presence there. We were asked to consider what practical steps we could take. We are submitting separately on the Angolan issue. I would like in this minute to look at the general implications of seeking to reduce Soviet influence in Africa.
2. This of course has long been a major foreign policy aim. It has been pursued with some success; Mozambique is perhaps the best example. But as Mozambique shows, we need the means to do the job. One essential instrument is aid. We shall be in touch separately with the ODA on this point.
3. Military assistance is probably as important as aid as an instrument of foreign policy in some African countries. Many, perhaps even most, suffer from undisciplined armies which menace political stability, social order or both. (Conversely in new countries without established political institutions, a well-disciplined army can be a force for stability.) Even quite small-scale military training and assistance can have an impact both in terms of improving the quality of troops and, above all, in increasing our political influence. In the case of those countries which depend on Soviet training or arms (and which therefore by definition are those which we should be looking at first if we are to seek to reduce Soviet influence), or which might be tempted to go down this road - Zimbabwe is the most worrying example (the air defence package) - an offer of some form of military assistance - training, material or both - is an essential part of our effort.
4. But the means available to HMG for this purpose are inadequate. Unlike the Soviet Union we do not normally dispose of large quantities of hardware which can be given away to potential clients

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or sold at uncommercial prices. What we have apart from the military training fund (which is I understand - but I would welcome further information - effective but small) is the Defence Policy Fund and UKMTAS.

(a) Defence Policy Fund

I understand that the £5m DPF is disbursed by MOD on the basis of the MOD's judgement of its own Ministerial interest. While this no doubt makes sense from a MOD point of view, it means that it may not always serve HMG's overall interests or still less the specific purpose of reducing Soviet influence in Africa.

- (b) UKMTAS funds for African in FY 87/88 amount to £6.7m which is already more than 50% of the total worldwide. Yet even so the fund is under great strain as a consequence of the emphasis we are now giving to positive measures in favour of the Front Line States and SADCC countries. This is a key element in our strategy of convincing the FLS and the wider Commonwealth that our opposition to sanctions does not mean that we support apartheid. The effort to rehabilitate the transport routes through Mozambique, which is the centrepiece of our aid, requires parallel measures (both military training and supply of equipment) to protect the routes and make them viable.

5. As a result we are now providing from UKMTAS funds military training for companies of the Mozambican army at Nyanga in Zimbabwe, in addition to the longstanding commitment to training the Zimbabwe army (one of the results of which has been to see off the North Koreans). We have also, as you know, had to draw on the FCO contingency reserve to finance the £2m package of non-lethal defence equipment for the same Mozambican companies as well as for Malawian, Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops to help them protect the transport routes through Mozambique more effectively. UKMTAS funds could not have been used for this purpose even if the money had been available.

6. These initiatives have had a political impact quite disproportionate to their cost. They have given a clear signal to the FLS of our determination to help them counter the destabilising effect of apartheid in the region, have encouraged the Mozambique Government to further distance itself from the Soviet Union (not least by demonstrating the clear superiority of British army training over the Soviet product) and have also sent a signal to Pretoria about the need to keep its hands off the transport routes. Other Western countries are now showing signs of following our lead, which is all to the good.

7. But the very success of the steps we have taken creates additional pressures and raises expectations. It is

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foreseeable that, as the work on the routes progresses, they will receive more attention from Renamo. The calls on us for help will increase accordingly. The Mozambicans are already pressing for an increase in our training effort. As matters stand there will be no scope for even a modest increase from the UKMTAS budget and of course we can hardly raid the contingency reserve a second time to fund further gifts of non-lethal defence equipment. Yet the only serious impediment now to our weaning Mozambique further away from the Soviet Union is our own inability to provide a significant amount of defence equipment at a subsidised rate and to step up our training effort.

8. So far as UKMTAS is concerned the FCO's PESC bid, which will be going forward in early February following consideration in the TMR, includes an additional £1.5m for Africa. Obviously the brief for the Secretary of State's use in his bilateral with the Treasury should refer to the Prime Minister's reflections as set out in paragraph 1 above and the higher priority which therefore in our judgement attaches to the PESC bid for UKMTAS.

9. I shall be looking again at the level of resources when I examine objectives for my area within the Top Management Review system but my preliminary impression is that the total remains inadequate. The original bid from the African departments for UKMTAS was for an additional £10m. In my view what is required is a flexible instrument, larger than the present UKMTAS and available to provide modest amounts of material assistance as well as training to those African countries where this would help to reduce Soviet influence or to prevent them establishing a position. It might be right to try to lump in the DPF. We need to ask ourselves whether further resources can be found to meet three policy objectives: to maintain our enhanced position in countries we have been able to assist recently by responding to requests for more; to counter Soviet influence; and to preserve into and beyond the next CHOGM the credibility of our alternative policy to sanctions - helping to the survivability of South Africa's neighbours.

10. I should welcome your views on all this and on how the MOD might be tackled (I suppose it would be right for you to do this). We then need to think in terms of a submission to No 10 without whose help the idea of a new Africa Defence Fund controlled by the FCO will get nowhere.

11. In any discussion with the MOD it might be worth raising the issue of high capitulation charges raised by them for loan service personnel funded through UKMTAS and the equally high costs charged for training in the UK as compared with training in the United States or I presume the Soviet Union. Both are

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fairly hoary and I realise that MOD are doing no more than respond to pressures placed on them by the Treasury. But the fact remains that we could do much more with existing funds if the MOD (or Treasury) could be persuaded that the costs of MOD personnel abroad or of training foreign army personnel in Britain should not have attributed to them every last cent of the cost of maintaining an army of our present size and its training facilities.

P S Fairweather

P S Fairweather

From: P S Fairweather

Date: 23 February 1988

cc: Chief Clerk
 Mr Munro
 Mr Tomkys
 Mr Goulden
 Mr Prendergast, SAFD
 Mr Cullimore, CAFD
 Miss Fort, WAD
 Mr Marsden, EAD
 Mr Yarnold, Defence Dept
 Mr Gore-Booth, Planners
 Mr Beel, Research Dept
 Mr Hemans, Soviet Dept

Mr Crabbie, Finance Dept

1988 PES ROUND

ADDITIONAL UKMTAS FUNDING ARISING FROM THE EFFORT TO REDUCE
 SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

A 1. As requested in your minute of 6 February, I submit an additional bid for UKMTAS for 1989/90 and the following two years. The bid is for £2.95m in year one and £3.2m in years two and three. The details are attached at Annex A. This bid is of course additional to the £1.05m which the TMR has already agreed should go forward (£0.5m for Mozambique; £0.25m for Malawi and £0.3m for Zimbabwe).

2. UKMTAS covers, as you know, only training courses in the UK and training programmes carried out by MOD personnel abroad (though exceptionally it was agreed last year that items of equipment should be provided from UKMTAS for Mozambican soldiers passing out of Nyanga). The events of recent months have demonstrated that there is a need for a fund which can provide non-lethal equipment to keep units in the field in Mozambique to provide security along the transit routes from Zimbabwe, Malawi (and perhaps in future Swaziland) into Mozambique. The relatively small sums provided in the current financial year are expected to make a useful contribution to the operational efficiency of the ZNA, Malawian, Tanzanian and Mozambican units concerned by providing key items of equipment otherwise not available. The political impact has been disproportionately great. We cannot, however, assume that the FCO Contingency Reserve can be used again in future to provide this equipment. I should therefore like to bid additionally for the establishment of an African Equipment Fund with effect from 1989/90. I realise that it will be difficult to agree the establishment of a new fund at short notice but to delay, as Mr Goulden recommended, until after the 1988 PES round, would be to risk a hiatus of one year. This would damage the credibility of our policy of positive measures for the Front Line States which is bound to come under intense scrutiny in the run up to the next CHOGM in September/October 1989 in Kuala Lumpur.

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B 3. The total bid for the Africa Equipment Fund, details of which are set out in Annex B, is for £2.35m in year one and £2.55m in years two and three. The difference is accounted for by the fact that item (c) - non-lethal equipment packages for Nyanga training Mozambican units - is being met from UKMTAS proper in year one and because the 1989/90 TMR-approved bid already provides £0.25m for an engineering team in Malawi (item g)

4. The additional UKMTAS bid and the bid under the African Equipment Fund would improve our chances of achieving important departmental objectives including:

- (a) reducing Soviet influence in Africa;
- (b) continuing to highlight the positive aspects of our Southern Africa policy, particularly aid for transit routes through Mozambique and to avoid exaggerated attention being given to our policy on sanctions;
- (c) doing what we can to reinforce the stability of friendly regimes in Africa, particularly those subject to destabilising attacks from the RSA;
- (d) reducing the dependence of South Africa's neighbours on routes through South Africa;
- (e) strengthening Mozambique's links with the West;
- (f) strengthening Swaziland's ability to cope with cross-border destabilisation and to participate in the protection of routes through Mozambique;
- (g) attaching proper importance to President Babangida's desire (shared by the Prime Minister) to strengthen the UK-Nigeria defence relationship;
- (h) contributing to keeping Somalia pro-Western when Siad Barre goes and to containing Libyan and Soviet Bloc influence in Uganda.

The bids for £1.05m referred to in para 4 of Mr Tomkys' minute of 9 February and already approved by the TMR are aimed at the first five of these objectives.

5. MOD have confirmed that there is no objection of principle to providing more training places in the UK or to the despatch of LSP teams; though they cannot at this stage guarantee places and it might take some months to put new teams into place.

P S Fairweather

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ANNEX A

ADDITIONAL UKMTAS BIDS

	(a) <u>Uganda</u>	
4	Special military visits programme	£0.1m (3 years)
	(b) <u>Tanzania</u>	
	Special military visits programme	£0.1m (3 years)
	(c) <u>Kenya</u>	
3	Special military visits programme	£0.05m (3 years)
	(d) <u>Zimbabwe</u>	
2.	Zimbabwe Staff College 4 man logistics training team	£0.25m (3 years)
	(e) <u>Zimbabwe</u>	
	Additional courses in UK	£0.15m (3 years)
	(f) <u>Zimbabwe</u>	
	Short term advisory visits to Zimbabwe	£0.02m (3 years)
	(g) <u>Malawi</u>	
	Engineering training team for Kamuzu Military College	£0.10m (1 year) £0.35m (yrs 2 & 3)
	(h) <u>Malawi</u>	
8	Additional training courses in UK	£0.05m (3 years)
	(i) <u>Mozambique</u>	
1.	Double size of Nyanga courses	£0.5m (3 years)
	(j) <u>Mozambique</u>	
	Additional training courses in UK	£0.1m (3 years)
	(k) <u>Zambia</u>	
	Military courses in UK	£0.05m (3 years)

/(i)

cf £1.47m

£1.67m

(1) Swaziland

BATT to be reinforced by 1 or 2 men £0.08m (3 years)

(m) Nigeria

Payment for training courses in UK
already earmarked for Nigerians £0.9m (3 years)

(n) Nigeria

Establishment of two new LSP teams

(i) Mechanical warfare (NASI) £0.25m (3 years)

(ii) Armoured school team £0.25m (3 years)

£2.95m Year 1

£3.2m Years 2 and 3

ANNEX B

AFRICA EQUIPMENT FUND

1=	(a) <u>Tanzania</u>	
	Non-lethal equipment	£0.5m (3 years)
	(b) <u>Somalia</u>	
2	Spares for Hawker Hunters	£0.25m (1 year)
	(c) <u>Mozambique</u>	
1=	Non-lethal equipment packages for Nyanga trained units	£0.45m (yrs 2 & 3)
	(d) <u>Mozambique</u>	
1=	Non-lethal equipment for security of Limpopo line	£0.5m (3 years)
	(e) <u>Zimbabwe</u>	
1=	Non-lethal equipment for ZNA units engaged on protection of Limpopo and Tete road convoy tasks	£0.5m (3 years)
	(f) <u>Malawi</u>	
1=	Non-lethal equipment for Malawi army units engaged on protection of Nacala line	£0.5m (3 years)
	(g) <u>Nigeria</u>	
3	Non-lethal military training aids	£0.1m (3 years).
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		£2.35 (year 1)
		£2.55 (years 2 & 3)